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IRELAND 1880-2005: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Sir David Williams *
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
has experienced massive constitutional change and constitutional
turmoil during the last thirty to thirty-five years. It has been an
era of entry into the European Union, of the rapid expansion of
administrative law, of exposure to domestic terrorism related to
Northern Ireland and more recently to international terrorism, of
the devolution settlements in Scotland and Wales, of constitu-
tional experiments in Northern Ireland, of the incorporation of
the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law by
virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998, of attempts to change the
composition of the House of Lords and to make both Houses of
Parliament more effective and democratically responsive, and of a
new-found constitutional confidence on the part of the judiciary.
* Sir David Williams, Q.C., Barrister, is Emeritus Vice Chancellor of the University
of Cambridge, Emeritus Rouse Ball Professor of English Law, and Life Fellow of Em-
manuel College, Cambridge, U.K. He is the former president of Wolfson College Cam-
bridge. A distinguished academic lawyer, Sir David also taught at the Universities of Not-
tingham and Oxford. At Oxford he taught at Keble College, later becoming an Honorary
Fellow. He is an honorary Queen's Counsel and was knighted in 1991. Sir David is a for-
mer member of the Council on Tribunals, the Marre Committee, and the Royal Commis-
sion on Environmental Pollution. He has published extensively on various issues relating
to English law and is a frequent guest speaker at international academic conferences.
These remarks were delivered at the University of Richmond School of Law on March
29, 2006. For the convenience of the reader, these remarks have been slightly edited from
the form in which they were delivered as a speech.
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Two recent decisions of the House of Lords in its judicial capac-
ityl-to be converted within the next few years into a Supreme
Court under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005'2-offer vivid ex-
amples of the constitutional issues now demanding resolution in
the courts. There are currently twelve members of the House of
Lords, and, unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, they
sit in panels, usually of five members, to hear a wide range of ap-
peals in private as well as public law. In the first of the recent de-
cisions, a panel of nine Lords of Appeal in Ordinary considered a
provision in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,'
enacted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, which allowed for de-
tention without trial.4 By a vote of eight to one, the House of
Lords ruled that the relevant section was incompatible with the
European Convention on Human Rights.5 British courts have no
power to strike down Acts of Parliament, but this declaration of
incompatibility made it politically necessary for the Government
to introduce amending legislation in the Prevention of Terrorism
Act 2005.6 In the second of the recent decisions, delivered in De-
cember 2005, a panel of seven unanimously held that evidence
obtained by torture was inadmissible in judicial proceedings,7
though inevitably a number of questions remain unanswered.
The tone of both decisions is striking. The Law Lords were con-
sciously speaking the language of constitutional fundamentals.
Lord Bingham, the senior Law Lord, spoke in the first case of
1. A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A. No. 2), [20051 UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C.
221 (H.L); A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (A. No. 1), [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2
A.C. 68 (H.L.).
2. See, e.g., Lord Windlesham, The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: Ministers,
Judges and Constitutional Change, 2005 PUB. L. 806, 811, 813, 820 (describing the pre-
liminary debates leading to the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005). See generally Lord
Windlesham, The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: The Politics of Constitutional Reform,
2006 PUB. L. 35, 35-37, 53-57 (detailing the final debates and conclusions of the Constitu-
tional Reform Act of 2005).
3. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (U.K).
4. A. No. 1, [20041 UKHL 56, at [7], [12], [14], [2005] 2 A.C. at 91, 94-95; see David
Feldman, Proportionality and Discrimination in Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 64
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 271, 271 (2005); Adam Tomkins, Readings of A. v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, 2005 PUB. L. 259, 259.
5. See A. No. 1, [2004] UKHL 56, at [72]-[73], [84]-[85], [97], [139], [160], [190],
[218], [239], [240], [2005] 2 A.C. at 127, 129, 132, 144, 150, 160, 170, 175.
6. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2 (U.K).
7. A. No. 2, [2005] UKHL 71, [52], [80], [97], [112], [129], [1501, [165], [2006] 2 A.C.
221, 270, 278, 282-83, 287, 292-93, 299, 304.
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the long libertarian tradition of English law, dating back to chapter
39 of Magna Carta..., given effect in the ancient remedy of habeas
corpus, declared in the Petition of Right 1628, upheld in a series of
landmark decisions down the centuries and embodied in the sub-
stance and procedure of the law to our own day.
8
Lord Hope insisted that "[iut is impossible ever to overstate the
importance of the right to liberty in a democracy."9 A commenta-
tor has said that the decision "will long remain a benchmark in
public law."1" In the second case, Lord Bingham referred to a
number of cases in other jurisdictions, 1' including Rochin v Cali-
fornia, 2 and Lord Hoffmann said that "the rejection of torture by
the common law has a special iconic importance as the touchstone
of a humane and civilised legal system." 3 There were passing ref-
erences in both cases to Guantanamo Bay 4 and, in the second
case, extra-legal "rendition" of suspects was mentioned.' 5
Each case arose in the context of international terrorism and
after the enactment of the Human Rights Act. In the context of
domestic terrorism, most of it associated with Northern Ireland
and its republican and the loyalist factions, several cases have
been decided by the European Court of Human Rights. These
cases include Ireland v. United Kingdom, 6 concerning detention
without trial,1 and McCann v. United Kingdom,"s which arose
from the shooting of three unarmed IRA members by SAS sol-
diers in Gibraltar."' One case in the United Kingdom arose from a
notice issued by the Home Secretary in 1988 to the BBC and the
IBA, the Independent Broadcasting Authority, effectively ban-
8. A. No. 1, [2004] UKHL 56, at [36], [2005] 2 A.C. at 107.
9. Id. at [100], [2005] 2 A.C. at 132.
10. Feldman, supra note 4, at 273.
11. A. No. 2, [2005] UKHL 71, at [17], [2006] 2 A.C. at 249-50.
12. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
13. A. No. 2, [2005] UKHL 71, at [83], [2006] 2 A.C. at 279.
14. Id. at [44] (per Lord Bingham), [126] (per Lord Hope), [2006] 2. A.C. at 267-68
(per Lord Bingham), 292 (per Lord Hope); see also A. No. 1, [2004] UKHL 56, at [223],
[2005] 2 A.C. at 171.
15. A. No. 2, [2005] UKHL 71, at [82], [2006] 2. A.C. at 279 (H.L.) (per Lord Hoffman);
see also id. at [103]-[107], [2006] 2 A.C. at 284-85 (H.L.) (Lord Hope's remarks referring to
the seventeenth century).
16. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 23 (1976).
17. Id. at 33.
18. 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1995); see K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER
THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN BRITAIN 235-41 (1990).
19. McCann, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 103-34.
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ning the real voice of people representing specified proscribed or-
ganisations in Northern Ireland and three lawful organisations
including Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA.20 The House of
Lords upheld the ban,2' and for some time actors were used to
speak the words of those organisations which came within its
scope. In another case on police powers, the House of Lords ruled
in favour of the police, holding that the trial judge in an action for
unlawful arrest "was entitled on the sparse materials before him
to infer the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion."22 Such
cases belong to an era when constitutional awareness was not as
widespread among the judiciary as it is today. This is not to ques-
tion particular proceedings but rather to speak of a very different
constitutional climate which has emerged since the coming into
force of the Human Rights Act.
In one major respect, however, the judiciary has frequently
been active in a manner which would be unacceptable to the fed-
eral judiciary of the United States. Over many years judges in the
United Kingdom have been called upon to investigate in an extra-
judicial capacity numerous general issues and, on occasion, par-
ticular events. Even before the First World War, Charles Evans
Hughes, then an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, said in the aftermath of his experience in serving
on a commission to determine the cost of handling second-class
mail that
[iut is best for the Court and the country that the Justices should
strictly limit themselves to their judicial work, and that the dignity,
esteem, and indeed the aloofness, which attach to them by virtue of
their high office as the final interpreters of legislation and constitu-
tional provisions, should be jealously safeguarded. 23
For much of the last century federal judges steered well clear of
"off-court chores," and the Commission, which under the chair-
manship of Chief Justice Warren investigated the assassination
of President Kennedy, was one of very few exceptions. 24 The prac-
20. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (Ex parte Brind) [1991] 1 A.C. 696, 711(H.L.).
21. Id. at 767.
22. O'Hara v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [19971 A.C. 286, 290
(per Lord Steyn) (H.L.).
23. 1 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 296-97 (1951).
24. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The Views of Chief
[Vol. 41:345
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tice in the United Kingdom has been different, with judges par-
ticularly involved in issues of "national security, allegations of
corruption, industrial disputes, public disorder, police conduct,
matters affecting commerce and national finance, [and] anti-
terrorism."25 Northern Ireland was the focus of several inquiries
in the 1970s, including the Tribunal of Inquiry chaired by Mr.
Justice Scarman to investigate violence and civil disturbances in
1969,26 a Commission chaired by Lord Diplock to consider legal
procedures to deal with terrorist activities,27 and the Tribunal of
Lord Chief Justice Widgery which reported in April 1972 on the
events of Sunday 30 January of the same year-known to this
day as Bloody Sunday-which led to civilian deaths and injuries
in Londonderry.28
Some inquiries in which serving judges have been involved are
relatively uncontroversial, but others have been open to criticism,
especially when a judge has to adjudicate on "a difficult and con-
troversial public issue" which could compromise his or her de-
tachment.29 It may well be, as I have suggested elsewhere, that
the reservations will become stronger as the courts assume more
of a constitutional mantle.3" Inquiries into a particular event,
such as the clash between soldiers and marchers on Bloody Sun-
day, invite direct criticism, and the Widgery Report was highly
controversial from the outset. It is perhaps significant that, al-
most as a prelude to peace negotiations in Northern Ireland
which led to the so-called Good Friday Agreement of April
1998 31-which in itself was intended as the precursor of a new
Justice Stone, 67 HARV. L. REV. 193, 194-95 (1953); Sir David Williams, Bias; The Judges
and the Separation of Powers, [2000] PUB. L. 45, 48-50.
25. Williams, supra note 24, at 48.
26. TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY, VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND
IN 1969, 1972, Cmnd. 566.
27. COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTM-
TIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185.
28. TRIBUNAL APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE EVENTS ON SUNDAY, 30TH JANUARY
1972, WHICH LED TO Loss OF LIFE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROCESSION IN
LONDONDERRY ON THAT DAY, REPORT, 1972, H.L. 101, H.C. 220.
29. See 572 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1996) 1282 (statement of Lord Simon).
30. See Williams, supra note 24, at 50; see also Louis Blom-Copper & Colin Munro,
The Hutton Inquiry, 2004 PUB. L. 472, 476 (arguing that the public's ready acceptance of
asking a senior judge to hold a public inquiry should be questioned); lain Steele, Judging
Judicial Inquiries, 2004 PUB. L. 738, 746-49 (arguing that the involvement of senior
judges in inquiries gives rise to serious constitutional concerns and should be avoided in
the future).
31. NORTHERN IRELAND HOME OFFICE, THE BELFAST AGREEMENT: AN AGREEMENT
2007]
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constitutional settlement-the Prime Minister announced in
January 1998 that Bloody Sunday would be revisited.32 A Tribu-
nal was established to re-examine the events of 30 January, "tak-
ing account of any new information relevant to events on that
day."3 3 With a view to guaranteeing impartiality, the Tribunal
was to be chaired by a serving Law Lord, Lord Saville of Newdi-
gate. He would be flanked by the Honorable William L. Hoyt, for-
merly Chief Justice of New Brunswick, and by a former member
of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand who later had to retire
through ill-health to be replaced by the Honorable John L. Too-
hey, a former member of the High Court of Australia. This inter-
national element, incidentally, was written into the peace process
from 1998 with close cooperation of the Republic of Ireland and
through strong support from the United States and Canada. The
Saville Tribunal has itself been remarkable. Its hearings came to
a close after seven years sitting in Northern Ireland and London.
The Tribunal heard some 900 witnesses and faced litigation in
the ordinary courts on such matters as the anonymity of wit-
nesses. 4 The financial cost has been very great, and we still
await the Tribunal's Report. Whether the claims and counter-
claims over Bloody Sunday can be resolved remains to be seen,
especially in the light of assertions that the "curse of Ireland has
been the length of its memory, "3 or that the "two great misfor-
tunes" in Anglo-Irish political relations are that the Irish memory
is too long and that the English memory is too short. 36
Indeed, if one goes back well over a hundred years to what was
then a united Ireland-partition came only from the 1920s-one
will find that the volatile and sometimes bloody decade of the
1880s ended with a lengthy inquiry. This was the so-called
Parnell Commission which was presided over by three High
Court Judges over 128 days and had every ingredient for public-
ity: a central figure, Charles Stewart Parnell, who was the char-
ismatic Irish politician of the decade, forged documents linking
REACHED AT THE MULTI-PARTY TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND, 1998, Cm. 3383.
32. Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, Statement to the House of Commons Estab-
lishing a New Inquiry into "Bloody Sunday" (Jan. 29, 1998), available at http://cain.ulst.
ac.uk/events/bsunday/tb29198.htm.
33. Id.
34. See R. v. Lord Saville of Newdigate (Ex parte A.) [1999] EWCA (Civ) 1136, 1
(Eng.).
35. See 149 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1921) 358.
36. See 162 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1949) 947.
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Parnell to the infamous Phoenix Park murders of the newly ar-
rived Chief Secretary for Ireland and his Under-secretary in Dub-
lin in 1882, and a dramatic and lengthy opening address for the
defence by Sir Charles Russell in which he expressed the hope
that the inquiry would "soften ancient prejudices" and "hasten
the day of true union and real reconciliation between the people
of Ireland and the people of Great Britain."37 The Commission in
essence provided a pause-admittedly a fraught pause-in the at-
tempt to solve the Irish Question. Looking back, the Commission
was an early, long-winded involvement of the judiciary in the af-
fairs of Ireland-but outside court. In matters of terrorism and
anti-terrorism, even in constitutional adjudication on Irish issues,
the judiciary of the United Kingdom has offered relatively little in
genuine litigation. The scene may change in the light of the new
constitutional self-awareness of the House of Lords in its judicial
capacity, but the history of constitutional developments in Ire-
land, and latterly in Northern Ireland, over the past 125 years
suggests that the constitutional initiative has largely rested with
the executive and the legislature.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THE PROJECTION OF 1886
Throughout the later part of the nineteenth century, the cause
of Irish nationalism was immensely boosted by the moral and ma-
terial support of the American Irish. The importance of the
American Irish was recognised early on by John Bright and John
Stuart Mill.3" In 1886, a Government Minister noted that the re-
sult of Ireland's "sufferings and our misgovernment in the past
has been the expatriation of millions of Irishmen. That expatria-
tion has created another and a larger, a freer, a richer, and a
more powerful Ireland beyond the Atlantic. .. ."" The decade be-
gan with the arrival of Parnell in New York on 2 January 1880,
and very soon he was assuring the American people generally
37. R. BARRY O'BRIEN, THE LIFE OF LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN 208-58 (2d ed. 1902);
see F.S.L. LYONS, CHARLES STEWART PARNELL 390-422 (1977); JOHN MACDONALD, DIARY
OF THE PARNELL COMMISSION (1890).
38. NICHOLAS MANSERGH, THE IRISH QUESTION 1840-1921, at 296-97 (3d ed. 1975)
(referring to remarks made in 1848 and 1868, respectively).
39. 305 PARL. DEB. H.C., (3rd ser.) (1886) 1186; see also 306 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3rd
ser.) (1886) 517. See generally F.M. CARROLL, AMERICAN OPINION AND THE IRISH QUESTION
1910-23: A STUDY IN OPINION AND POLICY 1-13 (1978).
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that they were "virtually the arbiters of this Irish question."4" He
attacked the British imperial government which, in his words,
"does not hesitate to spend 10 to 20 millions a year in childish
and cruel wars in all parts of the world" whereas "it would be
surely a good change if they would devote their attention to do-
mestic affairs and to securing the happiness and prosperity of
their own people at home instead of destroying that of other peo-
ple abroad."41 In one city after another his targets and emphases
varied, but he established a pattern of rhetoric and fundraising in
the United States which has been seen again in the last thirty-
five years.
When Parnell referred to the "Irish Question" there was an in-
evitable ambiguity: Was he referring to specific issues such as
land reform, was he alluding to separatism, or was he referring in
the language of the time to Home Rule? Even though many Irish
members of Parliament elected at the General Election of 1874
had put Home Rule into their election addresses, the meaning of
the phrase was never precise. It obviously raised the possibility of
some form of self-government for Ireland, but the scope and detail
of that aspiration were to dominate Irish politics and British poli-
tics for the next forty to fifty years-and the vestiges of the ambi-
guity linger on today. The perils of ambiguity were enhanced
when the central pillar of the British constitution, the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty or supremacy, could be invoked in re-
sponse; and parliamentary sovereignty was given an eloquent af-
firmation in 1885 with the publication of the first edition of A.V.
Dicey's The Law of the Constitution.2
Charles Stewart Parnell, a Protestant Irishman with an
American mother and with an undistinguished career as a stu-
dent at Cambridge University, 43 and his colleagues in Parliament
in London succeeded in stoking the fires of Irish dissent from the
40. ROBERT KEE, THE LAUREL AND THE IVY: THE STORY OF CHARLES STEWART
PARNELL AND IRISH NATIONALISM 217 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).
41. Id. at 219 (internal quotations omitted). The neglect of Irish affairs by the British
Parliament and Executive was frequently stressed, even by non-Irish politicians. See 306
Parl. Deb., H.C. (3d ser.) (1886) 948 (statement of John Morley).
42. E.C.S. WADE, INTRODUCTION TO A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (9th
ed. 1950).
43. His mother was Delia Tudor Stewart, descended from a family which claimed kin-
ship with the Tudor dynasty. His grandfather became a national hero when, as Commo-
dore Stewart, he captured two British ships off the coast of Spain in the War of 1812. See
LYONS, supra note 37, at 21-24; KEE, supra note 40, at 42-44.
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mid-1870s through obstructionist tactics in the House of Com-
mons-filibustering is not confined to the United States-and by
vigorous campaigns outside parliament, in the United Kingdom,
the United States, and elsewhere. Success of a kind was achieved
when William Ewart Gladstone-probably the outstanding Brit-
ish prime minister of the nineteenth century-was converted to
Home Rule, and his third period as Prime Minister saw the intro-
duction of the first Home Rule Bill, formally the Government of
Ireland Bill 1886."4 The proposed legislation provided for a na-
tional parliament for Ireland and its own executive, but with odd
balancing provisions such as the total exclusion of Irish members
from the imperial parliament in London, which would neverthe-
less have complete control over foreign relations.45 Dicey re-
sponded by writing a book entitled England's Case Against Home
Rule46 which gave strong emphasis to the need to preserve par-
liamentary sovereignty and to the undesirability of anything ap-
proaching federal government.47 One member of Parliament de-
clared that the Bill "sweats difficulties at every paragraph, every
provision breeds a dilemma, every clause ends in a cul de sac,
dangers lurk in every line, mischiefs abound in every sentence,
and an air of evil hangs over it all."4" After lengthy proceedings in
the House of Commons, the Bill was finally defeated by a vote of
343 to 313. The result was that Gladstone's government fell. The
cause of Home Rule suffered again when, having survived the
scrutiny of the Special Commission in 1890, Parnell lost much po-
litical ground after being cited in a divorce case, and then died
suddenly in only his mid-forties in 1891.
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty survived the defeat
of 1886 and was to play a part in numerous constitutional
changes yet to occur, affecting the United Kingdom as a whole as
well as the Irish Question. It shadowed later attempts to secure
Home Rule for Ireland, and was and still is highly relevant to the
debates on devolution for Scotland and Wales which was ulti-
44. The Government of Ireland (Home Rule) Bill, 1886 (Eng.), http://multitext.ucc.
Ie/d/HomeRuleBill1886.
45. See id.
46. A.V. DICEY, ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINST HOUSE RULE; (Richmond Publ'g Co. 1973)
(1886); see also Hugh Tulloch, A.V. Dicey and the Irish Question: 1870-1922, 15 IRISH
JURIST (N.S.) 137, 142-43 (1980). See generally W.R. Anson, The Government of Ireland
Bill and the Sovereignty of Parliament, 2 L.Q.R. 427 (1886).
47. See Tulloch, supra note 46, at 142-43.
48. 306 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3rd ser.) (1886) 362.
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mately secured through differing legislation in 1998 and is evolv-
ing slowly and sometimes in unexpected directions. Parliamen-
tary sovereignty has been central in the history of Northern Ire-
land since the early 1920s, and has loomed large with regard to
the European Union-which the United Kingdom joined on 1
January 1973-and with regard to the incorporation of the Euro-
pean Convention through the Human Rights Act 1998. In a lead-
ing case involving the Merchant Shipping Act, enacted by Par-
liament in 1988, the House of Lords accepted that national
legislation must not be applied if it conflicted with European
law.49 In the words of The Economist in 1995,50 British member-
ship in the European Union has "blown a hole through the middle
of Dicey's doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty."51 The Human
Rights Act does not expressly endanger parliamentary sover-
eignty, but the courts are empowered to declare, where appropri-
ate, that parliamentary legislation is incompatible with the
European Convention. Even though the initiative is formally that
of Government, it may often-as we have seen-be politically out
of the question to avoid new or amending legislation. Slowly and
unsurely the old assumptions of constitutional law are being un-
dermined.
Lurking behind many of the arguments of 1886 there was also
the matter of federalism. The United Kingdom in the nineteenth
century was a unitary country, but discussion of Home Rule
seemed to expose the possibility of a federal structure to accom-
modate Ireland and, in addition, Scotland and Wales; and argu-
ments about federalism were to continue whenever a new solu-
tion to the Irish Question was broached. In his Introduction to the
eighth edition of Law of the Constitution in 1914, Dicey com-
plained that "[a]dvocates of the so-called 'federal solution' appar-
ently believe that the United Kingdom as a whole will gain by ex-
changing our present unitary constitution for some unspecified
form of federal government."52 He added significantly that "[i]n
England, which is after all by far the most important part of the
49. R. v. Transport Sec'y (Ex Parte Factortame Ltd.) (No. 2), [1991] 1 A.C. 603, 676
(H.L.); see David Feldman, None, One or Several? Perspectives on the UK's Constitution(s),
64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 329, 345-46 (2005).
50. The Case for Reform, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 1995, at 25, 28.
51. Id. See generally H.W.R. Wade, Sovereignty-Revolution or Evolution, 112 L.Q.R.
568 (1996).
52. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
lxxxvii (8th ed. 1920). This introduction is from the original 1915 printing. Id.
[Vol. 41:345
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kingdom, the idea of federalism has hitherto been totally un-
known."53
Issues of federalism have arisen with surprising frequency in
several contexts over the past 125 years. First, as new countries
emerged from the Empire-countries such as Canada (federal),
Australia (federal), New Zealand, and South Africa-there was
somewhat idealistic talk of an Imperial Federation,54 but any
unity was to be replaced by the much looser association known as
the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth, which now has over
fifty member-countries, does not derive from Treaty and was de-
fined in 1971 as "'a voluntary association of independent sover-
eign States, each responsible for its own policies, consulting and
cooperating in the common interests of their peoples and in the
promotion of international understanding and world peace.' 5 5
Secondly, federalism was raised in the context of the Irish ques-
tion and more recently in seeking to establish the status of North-
ern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. This is where federalism
amounts to more than devolution-bearing in mind that devolu-
tion was described as early as 1913 as encompassing "a delega-
tion which postulates that the authority making the delegation
shall retain effective control over the exercise of the powers dele-
gated, and shall have an effective right to resume them."56 In
other words, devolution is compatible, at least in theory, with
parliamentary sovereignty. In a lecture delivered some five years
ago, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said that "[fiederalism repre-
sents a true division of power, whereas devolution is simply a
delegation,"5 7 but she added that devolution in the United King-
dom, "though cut from a different mould from our federalism, re-
flects many of the same values, and therefore many of the same
opportunities."" Yet, it was the essential threat to parliamentary
sovereignty which underlaid the feelings of 1886 and those feel-
ings persist to the present day.
53. Id. at lxxxviii-lxxxvix.
54. See 1 W.K. HANCOCK, SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS: PROBLEMS OF
NATIONALITY 1918-1936, at 1-2 (1937).
55. See, e.g., HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 62 (6th
ed. 2006) (quoting from the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting).
56. 53 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1913) 1322.
57. Sandra Day O'Connor, Altered States: Federalism and Devolution at the "Real"
Turn of the Millennium, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 493, 502 (2001).
58. Id. at 508.
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Devolution was thrust into prominence in the United Kingdom
through Scottish and Welsh aspirations in the 1960s, and for four
years a Royal Commission on the Constitution wrestled with the
variants of devolution before submitting a report in 1973.59 The
Commission spoke as Dicey might have put it, that "[tihere is
very little demand for federalism in Scotland and Wales, and
practically none at all in England,""° that "even at its best feder-
alism is an awkward system to operate,"61 that "a federal system
of government would require a written constitution, a special pro-
cedure for changing it and a constitutional court to interpret it,"
62
that "[ifederalism would tend to undermine" political and eco-
nomic unity, 63 and in short that "the United Kingdom is not an
appropriate place for federalism and now is not an appropriate
time."64 A distaste for the concept of federalism has been carried
over into current debates about the future of the European Union
and its member states. Few people, politicians or observers, are
agreed on the measure or degree of federalism involved, though
as early as 1962-well ahead of British entry-a distinguished
scholar wrote that "the political issues are ultimately more im-
portant than the economic .... The fundamental objective of the
architects of the [European Economics Community ("EEC")] is
quite frankly the political unification of Western Europe into a
federation or confederation of states."65 In this respect, it is inter-
esting that Justice O'Connor spoke in 2001 of the consensus that
the European Union "is neither a confederation nor a federal sys-
tem, but rather 'a construction sui generis somewhere between
the two.'
66
The confusion, the difficulty of definition, the variants of each
concept were all anticipated in the turbulent 1880s and especially
in 1886, but there was more to come.
59. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION 1969-1973, 1973, Cmnd. 5460.
60. Id. 498.
61. Id. 520.
62. Id. 527.
63. Id. 535.
64. Id. 539. See generally D.G.T. Williams, The Constitution of the United Kingdom,
31 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 266-77 (1972) (discussing the history of the federalist movement
in the United Kingdom).
65. See JAMES E. MEADE, U.K., COMMONWEALTH AND COMMON MARKET 9 (1962). See
generally Williams, supra note 64, at 284-90.
66. See O'Connor, supra note 57, at 506 (quoting Reimer von Borries & Malte
Hauschild, Implementing the Subsidiary Principle, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 369, 370 (1999)).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: 1893-1922 AND BEYOND
After the debacle of 1886, Gladstone lost office; but in 1892 he
returned as prime minister determined to use his fourth term to
secure Home Rule. The second Home Rule Bill 1893 was intro-
duced in the House of Commons.67 It contained significant
changes from the 1886 scheme, allowing, for example, for some
eighty Irish MPs in the Imperial Parliament at Westminster and,
at the same time, sought expressly to preserve parliamentary sov-
ereignty in the preamble." Dicey wrote another book entitled A
Leap in the Dark,69 claiming that "[n]ever before was a nation so
strangely advised by such bewildered counsellors to take for so
little apparent reason so desperate a leap in the dark."7" In Par-
liament, the 1893 Bill was seen by Lord Randolph Churchill as
"extravagant and grotesque,"7' and Joseph Chamberlain scorned
the attempt expressly to preserve parliamentary sovereignty.
72
From the Government benches came a more pragmatic approach.
Home Rule, said the Home Secretary, was not "a counsel of per-
fection" but the best way to deal with "a highly critical and com-
plex subject" and "a long stride towards a more generous Irish
policy."73 The Bill was approved by the House of Commons but
was soundly defeated by the unelected, mainly hereditary House
of Lords.74 One MP, the future Mr. Justice Darling of the High
Court of England and Wales, had already advised that the Bill
should be treated as "a celebrated gourmand" suggested as to the
dressing of a cucumber: "that they should add a little salt, a little
pepper, and a little oil in order to make it palatable and agree-
able; and having done so they should throw the preparation out of
[the] window."75
67. See LAWRENCE J. MCCAFFREY, THE IRISH QUESTION: 1800-1922, at 123 (1968).
68. See JAMES LOUGHLIN, GLADSTONE, HOME RULE, AND THE ULSTER QUESTION:
1882-93, at 264-65 (1987).
69. A. V. DICEY, A LEAP IN THE DARK: A CRITICISM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE
AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE BILL OF 1893 (2d ed. 1911).
70. Id. at 193.
71. See 8 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) (1893) 1611.
72. See id. at 1730.
73. See 17 PARL. DEB., H.L. (4th ser.) (1893) 393, 403.
74. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 67, at 123.
75. 12 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) (1893) 361. In the House of Lords in September
1893 a similar fate was reserved for a cooked pike: See 17 PARL. DEB., H.L. (4th ser.)
(1893) 388.
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Later on, in 1912, the then Prime Minister H. H. Asquith said,
with reference to the Bills of 1886 and 1893, that he did not wish
to burn his feet "in the embers of historical controversy."7 6 Never-
theless, the 1893 Bill, like its predecessor, fired constitutional is-
sues which have prevailed to this day and helps to explain the
strange Irish Question which still plays such an apparently dis-
proportionate part in the politics of the United Kingdom. One of
these issues is the clash between the constitutional pragmatists,
who saw such terms as Home Rule and, later, devolution as mal-
leable or adaptable, and the alleged purists, who adhered to a
strict doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and preferred preci-
sion. Secondly, there was the question of the House of Lords and
its place in the constitution, a compelling controversy today as be-
fore. Thirdly, there was the issue of partition as a temporary or
permanent fixture in a solution to the Irish Question, allied to the
more radical issue still of separatism or complete independence.
Constitutional pragmatism, allied to ambiguity in constitu-
tional terminology, persisted after 1893. For some years the po-
litical pressure for Home Rule eased somewhat. It returned vig-
orously, however, in the years immediately before the third Irish
Home Rule Bill of 1912,"7 which finally secured enactment in
1914,78 by virtue of the earlier Parliament Act 1911, " which had
provided for the by-passing of a veto in the House of Lords. ° The
Bill itself had inspired further insistence by Dicey on parliamen-
tary sovereignty, but the Government of Ireland Act 1914, l em-
bracing a united Ireland, was suspended because of the outbreak
of the Great War on 4 August 1914.2 The delay was fatal because
there followed the Easter Rising of 1916, a new turbulence in
Irish life, a particularly bloody period from 1919 to 1922, and
eventually the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act 1922, which ef-
fectively recognised secession for all of Ireland save Northern Ire-
76. See 36 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1912) 1402.
77. See D. GEORGE BOYCE, NINETEENTH-CENTURY IRELAND: THE SEARCH FOR
STABILITY 286 (1991); ALVIN JACKSON, THE ULSTER PARTY: IRISH UNIONISTS IN THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS: 1884-1911, at 128 (1989).
78. Government of Ireland Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 90 (U.K.).
79. Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13 (U.K.).
80. See id. §§ 1-2.
81. Government of Ireland Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 90 (U.K.).
82. See Suspensory Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 88, § 1 (U.K.) (suspending the effective-
ness of the Government of Ireland Act for no less than twelve months, nor more than the
duration of "the present war").
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land. 3 Secession was once again a pragmatic solution, and it was
to be over a quarter of a century before it was finally and fully ac-
cepted in the Ireland Act 1949.84 In 1922, there was talk of Do-
minion Status for the Irish Free State, akin to the status of the
older Dominions, and the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George,
saw it as "difficult and dangerous" to seek a definition of the term
as applied to Ireland. Lord Sumner, a serving Law Lord but not
overly responsive to the idea of separation of powers, intervened
in the legislative proceedings to criticise-from the standpoint, as
he put, of "a constitutional pedant"-numerous terminological
and other ambiguities in the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill. 5
Lord Carson, another Law Lord, also spoke against the Bill in ve-
hement terms.8 6 There was a sharp and unresolved conflict over
the propriety of these remarks, a further reminder of the differing
views on the notion of separation of powers in the United
States. 7 Pragmatism prevailed, however, and the Prime Minis-
ter, Clement Attlee, maintained the emphasis on pragmatism
when the Ireland Bill 1949 was introduced to recognise and regu-
larise the Republic of Ireland's departure from the Common-
wealth. 8 It is noteworthy that the Royal Commission on the Con-
stitution was distinctly uneasy about separatism as a possible
solution for Scotland and Wales. "An independent Scotland re-
taining its links with the Crown and the Commonwealth, as is
usually envisaged," it commented, "could later break those links,
as the Irish Republic did." 9 It was satisfied, however, that "the
necessary political will for separation [did] not exist,"9 ° which is
another way of stating that pragmatic or political factors would
prevail rather than neat constitutional formulae.
A second long-term legacy of the defeat of the 1893 Bill was
enhanced controversy about the powers and the composition of
the House of Lords as the second chamber or the Upper House of
83. See Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, c. 4 (U.K.). See generally
Brigid Hadfield, The United Kingdom as a Territorial State, in THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 585, 591-604 (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 2003).
84. See Ireland Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 41 § 1 (U.K.).
85. See 49 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1922) 524.
86. 49 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1922) 827-28.
87. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35-36 (1921) (holding that judges
must "give assurance that they are impartial").
88. See 464 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1949) 1854.
89. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION 1969-1973, 1973, Cmnd. 5460, 428.
90. See id. T 497.
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Parliament. As already indicated, some check on the legislative
power of the House of Lords was achieved by the Parliament Act
1911 and this was further extended by legislation of 1949;91 the
impact of the latter was only recently considered in the bitter af-
termath of the abolition of fox-hunting.92 The Life Peerages Act
1958, 13 allowing for the appointment of lords who would serve for
life, 14 was a serious and welcome break from the hereditary prin-
ciple, while the House of Lords Act 1999"5 has recently severely
reduced the body of hereditary peers with seats in the chamber,
with a view to their later abolition altogether.96 Nevertheless, a
Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, which
reported in 2000, has failed to lay the basis for comprehensive
change either in powers or in composition. 97 An attempt to kick-
start the process of wide-scale reform in a later White Paper 9 has
also been unproductive, and the stumbling blocks have included
the question of allowing for elected members and whether or not
to extend the powers of the House of Lords with a reformed com-
position. 99
Then there is the issue of the partition of Ireland. From the
outset of the Home Rule campaign, there had been in some quar-
ters an unqualified rejection of partition, expressed in Parnell's
91. Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103 (U.K.).
92. See Jackson v. Attorney General, [2005] UKHL 56 [1], [39], [2006] 1 A.C. 262,
270-71, 286 (H.L.) (per Lord Bingham) (upholding the validity of Parliament Act 1949 and
acts passed thereunder without the consent of the House of Lords). See generally Michael
Plaxton, The Concept of Legislation: Jackson v. Her Majesty's Attorney General, 69 MOD.
L. REV. 249 (2006).
93. Life Peerages Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 21 (U.K.).
94. Id. § 1.
95. House of Lords Act, 1999, c. 34 (U.K.).
96. See id. §§ 1-2 (disallowing membership in the House of Lords based upon heredity
peerages, but allowing for ninety exceptions to last for the member's life "until an Act of
Parliament provides to the contrary") (emphasis added).
97. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, A HOUSE FOR
THE FUTURE, 2000, Cm. 4534. The report provides a useful recent history of the House of
Lords, see id. 91 2.1 to 2.18, and there is an interesting chapter on the Law Lords and the
judicial functions of the second chamber, see id. %J 9.1 to 9.10. For a collection of essays
soon after the 1893 Bill, see THE HOUSE OF LORDS QUESTION (Andrew Reid ed., 1898).
98. PRIME MINISTER, THE HOUSE OF LORDS - COMPLETING THE REFORM, 2001, Cm.
5291, at ii-iii, 1$ 1-2, 4, 6, 97, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/holref/in
dex.htm.
99. See generally Peter Riddell, MPs Loath to Breathe Too Much Life into Rival Cham-
ber, TIMES (Eng.), Nov. 26, 2004, at 32 (stating that the House of Lords seems to have un-
finished business in British politics involving their chamber's power and composition).
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defiant cry: "No, Sir; we cannot give up a single Irishman."' 0 The
claims for a separate Ulster or part of Northern Ireland where
the Protestants were in a majority were already being heard
loudly by 1893; by 1913, Sir Edward Carson, later a Lord of Ap-
peal, claimed that the attempted betrayal of Ulster in the third
Home Rule Bill was "one of the most dastardly acts that has ever
disgraced the pages of history."1"' The Great War, as we have
seen, caused the suspension of the Government of Ireland Act
1914, and it never came into force. It was replaced by the Gov-
ernment of Ireland Act 1920102 providing for two legislative as-
semblies, one in Dublin and one in Belfast, cooperating through a
Council of Ireland. 1°3 The new scheme, despite not ruling out
eventual reunification, was never accepted in the south, which
successfully pressed for an Irish Free State, leaving the six coun-
ties of the north-Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, London-
derry and Tyrone-to continue as envisaged with a bicameral
Parliament and its own executive.
Outside observers might wonder at this outcome, but perhaps
enough has been said already to indicate the passions, not helped
by the sectarian divide, which underlined Home Rule. In the
build-up to the Home Rule Act 1914, many thousands of people on
both sides of the sectarian divide were prepared to take up arms
on the issue of Northern Ireland being carried perforce into a self-
governing united Ireland, and even Dicey-the exponent of the
Rule of Law as well as parliamentary sovereignty-pledged him-
self to armed resistance. 1 4 Yet the Ulster Unionists reluctantly
accepted the 1920 scheme for Northern Ireland as an alternative
to reunification, and in the words of the Royal Commission:
Northern Ireland, by one of history's choicest ironies, is the one place
where Liberal home rule ideas were ever put into practice-and by a
solidly Unionist government. It can truly be said to have been given
a constitution that it did not want and that was designed for another
place. '
0 5
100. See 306 PARL. DEB., H. C. (3rd ser.) (1886) 1180.
101. See 53 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1913) 1474.
102. Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67 (Eng.).
103. Id. §§ 1-2.
104. See R.F.V. HEUSTON, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 2-3 (2d ed. 1964).
105. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION 1969-1973, 1973, Cmnd. 5460, 1249.
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On achieving virtual independence in 1922, the Free State
adopted a constitution which was adopted and confirmed at
Westminster by the Irish Free State (Constitution) Act 1922.16
Ireland's so-called Dominion Status was a useful tool for gradual
erosion of restrictions in the 1922 statute. In 1937, a new consti-
tution for the "sovereign, independent, democratic state" of Eire
was adopted internally and then followed in Westminster by the
Eire (Confirmation of Agreements) Act 1938.17 Finally, all links
with the monarchy were severed, and this development was, as
we have seen, once again confirmed by Westminster in 1949.108
Ironically, relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom be-
came gradually closer thereafter, and the Dublin government has
been much involved with London over the troubles in Northern
Ireland after 1968.109 That it is not always easy to eradicate the
past, however, is illustrated by recent plans by the Republic of
Ireland finally to abolish thousands of laws dating back to the
Norman invasion and before.' 10
Meanwhile, after 1922, Northern Ireland appeared to settle
into its new constitutional status. Apart from its own parliament
and executive, the province enjoyed judicial oversight of the Gov-
ernment of Ireland Act 1920 through the courts of Northern Ire-
land, with perhaps the nearest approach to judicial review of leg-
islation-albeit of a subordinate legislature in theory-since
assertions of judicial review of parliamentary legislation in the
seventeenth century. In one case involving a challenge to a
Northern Irish statute, Lord Atkin said that "[t]hese questions af-
fecting [the] limitation on the legislative powers of subordinate
parliaments, or the distribution of powers between parliaments in
a federal system, are now familiar . . . ."11 In another case, Vis-
count Simonds urged a flexibility of construction appropriate for
constitutional instruments, adding that the courts of Northern
Ireland have in that process gained "from the manner in which
great judges among the English-speaking peoples overseas have
106. See 1 W.K. HANCOCK, supra note 54, at 159-60, 320.
107. See J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 21-27 (2d ed. 1984).
108. See J.J. LEE, IRELAND 1912-1985: POLITICS AND SOCIETY 300 (1989).
109. See, e.g., Political Breakthrough That Took 12 Years to Achieve: Complete Text of
Anglo-Irish Communique on Ulster, TIMES (Eng.), Nov. 16, 1985, at 4.
110. See David Sharrock, Ireland Casts Off Colonial Legacy of Crackpot Laws, TIMES
(Eng.), Mar. 13, 2006, at 23.
111. Gallagher v. Lynn [1937] 3 All E.R. 598, 601 (H.L.).
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dealt with kindred problems."112 The status of Northern Ireland
nonetheless remained unclear,'13 with one Australian scholar
writing that the Government of Ireland Act 1920 had created "an
odd sort of federal situation."' In 1973, the Royal Commission
on the Constitution said, however, that "the practice of home rule
was very different from the theory,""' adding forcefully that "a
large section of the community [was] always in a minority, with-
out any share in government or any prospect of securing a share
in government . "..."116 Unsurprisingly, the scheme of 1920 began
to disentangle, often bloodily, after 1968. As disturbances grew,
direct rule of Northern Ireland from London was introduced in
1972.117
There were various abortive efforts to secure a new constitu-
tional scheme for Northern Ireland, but these were part and par-
cel of a sustained battle between the forces of law and order and
the forces of terrorism in the province. This battle went on until a
cease-fire was achieved in the mid-1990s and then followed by the
Good Friday Agreement of 1998.118 Of course the various propos-
als for renewed devolution were caught up in ambiguities as
Home Rule had once been trapped; there were equally serious
ambiguities or evasions when observers spoke of terrorism and
anti-terrorism, both often selective terms depending on where you
start. There is no question that the law was unevenly or awk-
wardly administered under emergency legislation during the pe-
riod from 1921-22119 and this was also true of the thirty years fol-
112. See Belfast Corp. v. O.D. Cars Ltd. [1960] 1 All E.R. 65, 69 (H.L.). Reference was
made to American Justices Holmes and Brandeis and also to the Australian Constitution
and the issue of the division of powers in Canada. See id. at 69-70.
113. See Harry Calvert, Northern Ireland-What Went Wrong?, in WELSH STUDIES IN
PUBLIC LAW 86 (J.A. Andrews ed. 1970); see also A.G. Donaldson, The Constitution of Ire-
land: Its Origins and Development, 11 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 5-6 (1955).
114. See GEOFFREY SAWER, MODERN FEDERALISM 57 (1969).
115. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION 1969-1973, 1973, Cmnd. 5460,
1250.
116. See id. T 1268.
117. See Sir David Williams, The United Kingdom's Response to International Terror-
ism, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 683, 688 (2003).
118. Patrick E. Tyler, Strife Drops, and Belfast Builds Again with Hope, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2004, at A3; Editorial, Sinn Fein at the Door, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2005, at
A12.
119. See K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES: POLITICAL
FREEDOM AND THE RULE OF LAW IN BRITAIN 1914-1945, at 368-69 (2000) (providing an
illuminating legal and historical perspective on civil liberties in both world wars and the
inter-war period).
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
lowing 1968.12° In times of emergency, the Rule of Law is sorely
tested, and in that period of thirty years a new and fluctuating
body of statutory law emerged, principally, though not exclu-
sively, related to terrorism in or related to Northern Ireland.
There were obvious implications for
approaches to national security (including the involvement of the Se-
curity Service, M15), to police powers, to the maintenance of public
order, to the exercise of administrative discretion at its widest level,
to ombudsman procedures, to the status of the police, to the systems
of prosecution and of trial, to the use of informers, to the employ-
ment of the military arm in aid of civil power, and to co-operation in
law enforcement with other countries including the Republic of Ire-
land and the United States. 121
Apart from recognition of the massive damage to property and
general disruption caused by terrorism in the province, it needs to
be recorded that "Ib]etween 1969 and 30 November 1998, 3289
people died in Northern Ireland ag a direct result of Irish terror-
ism . . . and between 1972 and the end of November 1998, 121
people have been killed in Britain in incidents of Irish terror-
ism. " 122 Between 1976 and November 1998, there were 94 inci-
dents of international terrorism in the United Kingdom and these
included the bomb planted on Pan Am flight 103 which exploded
over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1998, killing 270 people.123
The United Kingdom was not unaware of the impact of interna-
tional and especially domestic terrorism; in 2000 a large Terror-
ism Act was produced by Parliament to take account of the legis-
lation, the inquiries and the wider responses since 1968.124 This
measure contains 131 sections and 16 schedules. 125 Three months
after the events of 11 September 2001 a further measure-the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 126 with 129 sections and
120. See K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
MODERN BRITAIN 209-54 (1990). This chapter is entitled "Legal Responses to Terrorism."
Id. at 209.
121. Williams, supra note 117, at 688. See generally ANTONIO VERCHER, TERRORISM IN
EUROPE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 9-161 (1992); CLIVE WALKER,
THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW (2d ed. 1992).
122. HOME OFFICE & NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM,
1998, Cm. 4178, 2.2; see Williams, supra note 117, at 689.
123. HOME OFFICE & NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM,
1998, Cm. 4178, 2.3
124. See Williams, supra note 117, at 687-88.
125. See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (U.K.).
126. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (U.K.).
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8 schedules, was passed and was described by one legal commen-
tator as "the most draconian legislation Parliament has passed in
peacetime in over a century."127
More legislation on terrorism was to follow, not without diffi-
culties on such issues as detention without trial and the at-
tempted introduction of a new offence of incitement to religious
hatred.12 Throughout the various parliamentary proceedings
there has never been anything approaching a precise definition of
terrorism. The definition provided in the Terrorism Act 2000 is,
in the words of a committee of the House of Commons, "compli-
cated but essentially it provides that terrorism is the use, or
threat, of action which is violent, damaging or disrupting and is
intended to influence the government or intimidate the public
and is for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideo-
logical cause." 29 The difficulty is that "it is possible to extend the
statutory definition of terrorism to encompass the actions of those
involved in industrial disputes, political processions, religious
demonstrations, animal rights protests, and a variety of other
public meetings in circumstances where the ordinary criminal
law has hitherto sufficed." 3 ° In the past there have been no ac-
cepted definitions of such terms as "security" or "subversion" or
"sabotage," and "terrorism" adds a further measure of ambiguity
which may be inevitable but sits uneasily with the Rule of Law.
The Belfast Agreement of 1998,"' also known as the Good Fri-
day Agreement, 132 is riddled with ambiguities at a wider constitu-
tional level, with pragmatism pointing the way as it had in 1922.
Resulting from discussions involving the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Ireland, the Agreement reaffirmed "total and absolute
commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of re-
solving differences on political issues" and "opposition to any use
127. See Adam Tomkins, Legislating Against Terror: The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001, 2002 PUB. L. 205, 205.
128. See Sir David Williams, Toleration, Religion and the Law, in CIVILISATIONS AND
PUBLIC LAW 523, 523-35 (Evangelos Venizelos & Antoine Pant6lis ed., 2005).
129. DEFENCE COMMITTEE, THE THREAT FROM TERRORISM, 2001-2, H.C. 348-1, 1 5.
130. Sir David Williams, Terrorism and the Law in the United Kingdom, 26 U. NEW S.
WALES L.J. 179, 179 (2003).
131. NORTHERN IRELAND HOME OFFICE, THE BELFAST AGREEMENT: AN AGREEMENT
REACHED AT THE MULTI-PARTY TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND, 1998, Cm. 3883.
132. See BBC, Wars and Conflict: The Good Friday Agreement, http://www.bbc.co.
uk/history/recent/troubles/agreementlagreement.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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or threat of force . . . for any political purpose." 3' Numerous
commitments, institutional or political or operational, were en-
tered into, and the situation in Northern Ireland was unques-
tionably improved: though even in August of the same year a
large car-bomb exploded in the centre of Omagh killing twenty-
eight people and injuring at least 220.13 The Northern Ireland
Act 1998,135 enacted after separate referendums in Northern Ire-
land and the Republic of Ireland had approved the Agreement,
provided for a number of matters including the establishment of
an Assembly working on a "complex scheme of power sharing be-
tween the main parties" under a special form of devolution.136 The
devolved form of government duly came into being, but the legacy
of the past and the unresolved issues of 1998, such as the decom-
missioning of arms, have led to two suspensions of the operation
of the Assembly: one from February to May 2000,137 and the other
from 2002138 with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at
the helm.
There is no obvious moral to be drawn from the events in Ire-
land over 125 years. The British constitution, however, such as it
is, has been stretched and scarred in the period by Irish events.
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, with all its scars, re-
mains the guiding basis for action-because of or in spite of in-
volvement in Europe through membership of the European Union
and adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights.
The independence of the judiciary has been called into question,
but the recent cases on terrorism generally and the history of ju-
dicial review under the older system in Northern Ireland suggest
that the courts may be more prominent in the future. If the devo-
lution schemes of Scotland and Wales as well as Northern Ireland
settle down, the structure of the United Kingdom will be irrepa-
rably changed-and it all stems from the original campaign for
Home Rule. The House of Lords in its legislative form will be
133. See NORTHERN IRELAND HOME OFFICE, THE BELFAST AGREEMENT: AN AGREEMENT
REACHED AT THE MULTI-PARTY TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND, 1998, Cm. 3883, 4.
134. See CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
209 (2002).
135. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 (U.K.).
136. See A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 46-
47 (13th ed. 2003).
137. See id. at 47.
138. See NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, THE NORTHERN IRELAND ACT 2000 (SUSPENSION
OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT) ORDER 2002, No. 2574.
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radically changed, a reminder of the frustrations on Irish Home
Rule in 1893; and the House of Lords in its judicial capacity is
likely to end soon, to be replaced by a Supreme Court. Mean-
while, constitutional ambiguities remain, and it is well to be re-
minded that in all countries there is the likelihood of pure consti-
tutional theories being submerged in a welter of political and
pragmatic considerations. Such has been our history in relation to
Ireland over 125 years.
It is perhaps appropriate to end by quoting James Bradley
Thayer's perhaps overly-generous comment in his review of the
first edition of Dicey's Law of the English Constitution:
When one scrutinizes the English Constitution, it is like looking at
the nests of birds or at the curious and intricate work of beavers and
insects; its strange contrivances seem not so much the ordered and
foreseen result of human wisdom as a marvellous outcome of in-
stinct, of a singular political sense and apprehension, feeling its sure
way for centuries, amid all sorts of obstacles, through and around
and over them, with the busy persistence of a tribe of ants. 139
139. James Bradley Thayer, Dicey's Law of the English Constitution, in LEGAL ESSAYS
191, 191 (1927).
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